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ARTICLE
Michael Ariens
Model Rule 8.4(g) and the Profession’s Core Values Problem
Abstract. Model Rule 8.4(g) declares it misconduct for a lawyer to “engage
in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.” The American
Bar Association (ABA) adopted the rule in 2016 in large part to effectuate the
third of its four mission goals: Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity. The ABA
adopted these goals in 2008, and they continue to serve as ABA’s statement of
its mission.
A substantial number of lawyers opposed the ABA’s adoption of Rule 8.4(g),
most often on free speech and religious liberty grounds. Since its adoption by
the ABA, lawyers have argued for and against state adoption of Rule 8.4(g), in
part based on competing understandings of the “core values” at stake in this
debate.
References to the core values of the American legal profession emerged
relatively recently. They are also often mentioned absent any particular
definition. Not surprisingly, lawyers disagree about whether some normative
declaration expresses a core value for American lawyers. They also disagree
whether there exists a hierarchical ranking of core values, and if so, how to
organize core values in tension with one another. In part, this represents a longexisting debate among lawyers about how to fulfill one’s duties to client, court,
third parties, and community. It also reflects a split among American lawyers.
The American legal profession has been fractured along a number of axes for a
long time. Private practice lawyers specialize in vastly different fields of law;
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they work alone, in Big Law, in government, in corporations, and in legal
aid/public interest entities; they represent disparate types of clients, such as
individuals and organizations, and within those hemispheres, they represent
persons and organization with diverse legal needs and interests; they work in
small towns and large cities; they earn millions and support themselves by taking
second jobs; and they differ in their views regarding the usual subjects, politics,
culture, and religion. Such a disaggregated group will struggle to form a
consensus, much less an overwhelming majority, about what values lie at the
core of a definition of “lawyer,” “legal profession,” the “practice of law,” or
“the lawyer’s duties.” The Rule 8.4(g) debate may offer some insight into why
the parties seem to speak past one another, and whether any core values are
embraced across the divisions within the legal profession. Relatedly, the ABA’s
shrinking membership reflects the difficulty of speaking of a (singular) legal
profession, and the decline in the ABA’s influence indicates it is less likely to be
able to generate a broader acceptance of specific core values as reflected in rules
such as 8.4(g).
Author. Professor Michael Ariens is the Aloysius A. Leopold Professor of
Law at St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas. He would like to thank
Elise McLaren and Sameer Bhuchar for their research assistance.
Professor Ariens has written a book concerning the history of American lawyer
ethics, titled REMNANTS OF CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWYER
ETHICS. It will be published in 2022.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the August 2003 annual meeting of the American Bar Association
(ABA), members of its House of Delegates debated whether to approve two
proposed amendments to Model Rule 1.6(b).1 These amendments created
additional exceptions to the lawyer’s duty to keep a client’s confidences.2
The House had balked at doing so two years earlier,3 when the Commission
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, popularly known as
the Ethics 2000 Commission, made its recommendations.4 The ABA’s
decision to reconsider arose after the large energy corporation, Enron, filed
for bankruptcy amid allegations of financial improprieties in early December
2001.5 The once-rejected exceptions were re-offered and supported by a
coalition of twelve ABA presidents, twelve ABA section cosponsors, and
the “Conference of Chief Justices,” an organization of state supreme court
chief justices.6 Despite this firepower, a significant debate took place about
the compatibility of these exceptions with the legal profession’s core
values.7 Both sides claimed they were the true defenders of the profession’s
1. See Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1,
14–19 (2003) (providing the debate over Report 119A, which sought to add two provisions to Model
Rule 1.6).
2. Id. The proposed exceptions it adopted allowed a lawyer to disclose a client confidence
“to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used
or is using the lawyer’s services,” and “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”
Report No. 1 of the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility et al., 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A 499, 499–500 (2003)
(recommending adding Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3)).
3. See Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 35–37
(2001) (striking the proposed additions to Rule 1.6(b)). The Ethics 2000 Committee, proposing
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, suggested three changes to Model
Rule 1.6(b). The Delegates approved only one amendment, which permitted (but did not require) a
lawyer to disclose a client confidence “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”
Id. at 61–62.
4. Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
257, 257, 261 (2001).
5. Two excellent studies of the fall of Enron are KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS:
A TRUE STORY (2005) and BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (10th Anniversary ed. 2013). For a
pointillist study of the history of the Model 1.6(b) amendments, see generally Michael Ariens, “Playing
Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PRO. 239 (2009).
6. Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 14
(2003).
7. Id. at 14–19.
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core values. Incoming ABA president, Dennis W. Archer, supported the
proposed exceptions.8 He argued, “confidentiality, professional integrity,
independence, and autonomy are core values which are sacrificed when a
lawyer is deprived of the ability to reveal information necessary to prevent
a client from misusing the profession and the lawyer’s services to commit a
crime, fraud, causing substantial harm to innocent third parties.”9 The
incoming President-elect (that is, Archer’s successor), Robert J. Grey, Jr.,
argued in opposition to the proposed amendments to Rule 1.6(b).10 In his
view, “this was not the time to take the position that the core values of this
profession are subject to compromise.”11 Grey was joined by Sharon Stern
Gerstman, a member of the ABA’s Board of Governors.12 She argued the
House had properly “refused to allow its core values to diminish”13 when
it rejected those amendments in 2001. The House of Delegates approved
the amendments in a recorded vote by just 218 to 201.14
This was the second debate about core values in the House of Delegates
in three years. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4(a) (1983)
generally prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.15
Rule 5.4(b) bans a lawyer from forming “a partnership with a nonlawyer if
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.”16
Both provisions were justified on the belief that allowing lawyers and
nonlawyers to join together to offer legal and other professional services
(e.g., accounting) in a jointly-owned entity might permit the latter to control
the relationship between lawyer and client.17 Such control, supporters of
these Rules traditionally argued, might harm the interests of the lawyer’s

8. Id. at 18.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 16.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 18 (recording the vote); see also James Podgers, The Non-Revolution: Proponents of a New
ABA Ethics Rule on Confidentiality Downplay Its Impact, 89 A.B.A J. 80, 80 (Oct. 2003) (recounting the
debate).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2020).
16. Id. at R. 5.4(b).
17. See id. at R. 5.4 cmts. 1 & 2 (indicating the Rule expresses traditional limitations regarding
the importance of an attorney’s independence and professional judgment in rendering advice to a
client).
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clients. The usual argument was that profits would come before duty to
legal client.18
By the late 1990s, the largest accounting firms (then the “Big Five”)
employed thousands of lawyers.19 The Big Five offered their clients tax,
accounting, consulting, regulatory, and other services, including services
often provided by lawyers. This worried large law firms, the part of the
organized bar that often competed with the Big Five.20 These firms feared
they faced a competitive disadvantage if the traditional rules remained. That
fear led the ABA to reconsider the ethics rules banning multidisciplinary
practice (MDP) organizations owned by both lawyers and nonlawyers.21 It
created a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in August 1998 to
recommend how the ABA should proceed.22
The Commission reported back a year later in support of amending the
rules and permitting lawyers “to deliver legal services through a
multidisciplinary practice.”23 For reasons relating to internal ABA politics,
its recommendation was postponed.24 The Commission returned a year
later, reaffirming its recommendation.25 It added the proviso that any
specific changes to the Model Rules be implemented to protect the public
and preserve “the core values of the legal profession, including competence,
independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client
information, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts of

18. See id. (drawing a comparison to Rule 1.8(f), which permits a lawyer to accept payment from
a third party so long as it did not interfere “with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment” and
the client gave informed consent).
19. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 869, 878 & n.31 (1999) (counting 6,362 lawyers in Big Five firms other than tax lawyers).
20. See id. at 878–79 (indicating, when a leading journal combined “statistics of the Big Five
firms with the statistics from traditional law firms,” a list “of the ten largest law firms worldwide
included three of the Big Five”).
21. See Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 223, 225 (1999)
[hereinafter Report] (indicating the ABA president, in response to professional service firms delivering
legal services, formed a commission to determine if the ABA should amend Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to address the situation).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 223.
24. The Florida Bar pushed for delay. See Report of the Florida Bar, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 753,
753 (1999) (recommending the ABA delay changing the Model Rules); Proceedings for the Annual Meeting
of the House of Delegates, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 10–14 (1999) (recording the debate on and decision
to delay).
25. Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 183, 183 (2000)
[hereinafter Multidisciplinary Report].
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interest, and pro bono publico obligations.”26 The ABA House of Delegates
rejected the Commission’s recommendation at its August 2000 meeting.27
It then resolved to adopt a set of core values of the profession. It urged
states considering whether to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs to make
their decisions in such a way as to “preserve the core values of the legal
profession.”28 As adopted by the House, those values overlapped but were
not congruent with the Commission’s core values.29
These two debates suggested both that invoking core values in an
argument was perceived as necessary to win a debate, and that the content
of the American legal profession’s core values was unsettled at best, and
malleable and lacking any definitional rigor at worst. These propositions do
not mesh well.
When H. Thomas Wells became ABA president in mid-2008, he wrote in
his first monthly column for the ABA Journal that his presidency would
concentrate on making progress on four of “the common core values all
lawyers share”: “access to justice, independence of the bar and judiciary,
diversity and the rule of law.”30 That same year, the ABA formally adopted
four “goals” intended to aid the ABA in meeting its mission. Those goals
were: “[s]erve [o]ur [m]embers,” “[i]mprove [o]ur [p]rofession,” “[e]liminate
[b]ias and [e]nhance [d]iversity,” and “[a]dvance the [r]ule of [l]aw.”31 Each
goal included several specific measures.32
The ABA House of Delegates adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) at its 2016
annual meeting in significant part to make progress on the ABA’s third goal:
26. Id.
27. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 24 (2000).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 24–25. The most important difference was an emphasis in the House of Delegates on
the lawyer’s duty to the public. The House’s fifth core value was “the lawyer’s duty to help maintain a
single profession of law with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system,
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” Id. at 24. The language
listing the lawyer’s multiple “responsibilities” is taken directly from Preamble [1] of the Model Rules.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). The demise of Enron, which
was quickly followed by the indictment and conviction of the Big Five accounting firm of Arthur
Andersen, BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 143–44 & 406 (10th Anniversary ed. 2013), led
states to halt efforts to amend Rule 5.4. See Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the
Very Black Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002) (recounting, by a fervent opponent of MDPs,
how “Enron proved the death knell of MDPs”).
30. H. Thomas Wells Jr., Justice to the Core, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2008, at 9.
31. ABA Mission and Goals, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-missiongoals/ [https://perma.cc/8VV9-6CKE].
32. See id. (listing each goal’s objective).

2021]

Model Rule 8.4(g) and the Profession’s Core Values Problem

187

“[e]liminate [b]ias and [e]nhance [d]iversity.”33 It did so with “no debate in
the House and few overt signs of opposition” when it came time for
discussion and vote.34 However, it is also clear that significant debate and
opposition occurred in the roughly year-long process prior to the ABA’s
adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g).35 Model Rule 8.4(g) declares it misconduct
for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the
practice of law.”36 It also includes two exceptions: “This paragraph does
not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”37
Model Rule 8.4(g) demands lawyers consider the question of core values.
Proponents of Rule 8.4(g) wanted a rule with more teeth to lessen (if not
end) invidious discrimination in the profession.38 Rule 8.4(g) would go
some way to meeting the ABA’s third goal, to “eliminate bias and enhance
diversity.” One argument its opponents used centered on its possible
impact on the core value of the independence of lawyers from state
control.39 This tension between core values is unlikely to dissipate.
The goal of this Article is to examine the rise of the idea of the
profession’s core values and how that idea informs the divided reception of
Model Rule 8.4(g). Since its adoption in the ABA, states have been at odds
in deciding whether to adopt it as a rule of discipline for their lawyers. This
Article begins with a survey of the background of the principles espoused
in the ABA’s lawyer ethics rules from the adoption of the Canons of Ethics
in 1908. It then discusses the reasons for the debate on the profession’s

33. Id.; see Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(G):
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PRO. 201, 204, 211, 221
(2017) (noting only one ABA section mentioned any goal other than Goal III).
34. Lorelei Laird & James Podgers, House Passes Bias Rule, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2016, at 59.
35. See Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 204, 219–23 (describing the process leading up to
Model Rule 8.4(g)’s adoption).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
37. Id.
38. See generally Laird & Podgers, supra note 34 (describing how many proponents of Rule 8.4(g)
believed the Model Rules needed a binding provision to prohibit discrimination and harassment).
39. See id. at 59 (describing how the Rule’s opposition worried the Rule would, for example,
“undermine free speech and religious freedom”).
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core values. After discussing the history of Rule 8.4(g), it assesses the
responses in the profession to the proposal.
II. ILLUSTRATIONS AND PRINCIPLES
A. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908)
The ABA committee that drafted the Canons of Ethics (1908) included a
number of well-known legal ethics writers, the most important of whom
was Thomas Goode Jones. Jones wrote the first code of ethics, adopted by
the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887.40 The Alabama code included
an oath and fifty-seven canons of ethics, and served as the blueprint for the
ABA.41 As adopted, the ABA code of ethics consisted of an oath and thirtytwo canons of ethics.42 It was praised by many,43 and by 1914, thirty-one
state bar associations had adopted it.44 A few, however, were disappointed.
The most important of those dissenters was Charles A. Boston, a New York
lawyer.45 From 1908 until shortly before his death in 1935, Boston spent a
40. Thomas Goode Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS
GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 45, 45–59 (Carol Rice
Andrews et al. eds., 2003); see also BRENT J. AUCOIN, THOMAS GOODE JONES: RACE, POLITICS, AND
JUSTICE IN THE NEW SOUTH 19 (2016) (explaining how Jones’s “most noteworthy accomplishment
as a lawyer” was writing the legal “profession’s first ever Code of Legal Ethics” adopted by the Alabama
State Bar Association).
41. See generally Jones, supra note 40 (providing the oath and fifty-seven canons of ethics); see also
AUCOIN, supra note 40, at 19 (indicating Jones’s Code of Legal Ethics “served as the basis for the Code
of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1907”).
42. CANONS OF ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
43. See generally Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 541
(1908) (praising the code). Baldwin founded the ABA in 1878. See JOHN AUSTIN MATZKO, BEST
MEN OF THE BAR: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1878–1928, at 14–24
(2019) (explaining how “Baldwin moved that a committee of three be appointed to consider the
propriety of organizing a national association of lawyers”); EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 3–13 (1953) (providing a history of the beginnings
of the American Bar Association); Charles C. Goetsch, Baldwin, Simeon Eben, in THE YALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 25 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (“Baldwin was
the key founder of the American Bar Association in 1878 . . . .”).
44. Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics, 37 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 559, 560–61 & n.3 (1914)
(listing thirty plus Arizona). All state bar associations were voluntary at this time. The mandatory bar
movement, which required every lawyer licensed in a state to be a member of the state bar association,
began in 1920. See DAYTON DAVID MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 21–29 (1963) (providing a
brief history of bar integration in the United States).
45. William W. Miller, Charles A. Boston, 1863–1935, A.B.A. J., May 1935, at 281; Frederick C.
Hicks, Boston, Charles Anderson, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICA BIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT 1, at 98
(1944).
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significant amount of time volunteering his services to bar associations to
promote lawyer ethics.46
Boston criticized the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics for failing to
draft a set of principles and, instead, offering illustrations of behavior that
were condoned or condemned.47 As Boston became more immersed in the
subject of lawyer ethics, his opinion of the Canons hardened. This was a
consequence of his work as chairman of the professional ethics committee
of the New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA).48 Boston
convinced the NYCLA Board that the ethics committee should offer
guidance to lawyers by answering their ethics questions. It began to do so
in 1913.49 By the early 1920s, Boston believed the Canons were out-ofdate, as the illustrations were so specific they too often failed to address
current ethics problems. He stated: “I think that comparatively few of the
questions submitted to our [NYCLA ethics] committee could be answered
by any provision of the canons.”50
Boston was appointed chairman of the ABA Committee on
The
Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics in 1924.51
committee published its draft proposals in the ABA Journal in

46. Boston served as the chairman of the professional ethics committee of the New York
County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA) from 1909 until 1932. For much of that time it was the most
important ethics committee in the country, for, at Boston’s urging, it was the first ethics committee to
answer ethics questions asked by practitioners. See The Legal Ethics Clinic of the New York County Lawyers
Association, 7 ILL. L. REV. 554, 554 (1913) (discussing NYCLA’s service in answering ethics questions
proposed by members of the bar). Boston was an original member and the second chairman of the
ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics from 1913 to 1916. From 1921 to 1924, he served as
secretary to the ABA Committee on Canons of Judicial Ethics and was responsible for drafting the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. From 1924 to 1928, he was the chairman and principal draftsman of the
Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics. He continued to serve as chairman of
that committee off and on from 1928 until 1934. This information is taken from the list of committee
members published in the Annual Report of the American Bar Association, as well as the annual
reports to the ABA. See, e.g., infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 45, at
281–82 (describing Boston’s various roles and impact on the area of legal ethics).
47. Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 224, 225 (1908).
48. Cf. supra note 46 (describing Boston’s work as NYCLA chairman).
49. See supra note 46 (describing how Boston urged the NYCLA to begin answering ethics
questions posed by practitioners).
50. Thomas Francis Howe, The Proposed Amendment to the By-Laws, A.B.A. J., July 1922, at 436
(quoting Boston).
51. See Special Committees, 47 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 24, 26 (1924) (listing Boston as chairman of the
Special Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics).
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mid-1927.52 The final proposed supplemental canon was titled Summary of
the Professional Ideals of the Lawyer.53
This summary canon was written by Henry Wynans Jessup, also a New
York lawyer and member of the ABA Committee.54 Boston and Jessup had
worked together on the NYCLA’s ethics committee from 1908 until Jessup
resigned in 1924. They were long-time friends with a deep interest in
working out the ethical standards of the legal profession. Both agreed that
the failure of the ABA Code was that it lacked reference to principles.
Jessup had been working on a summary of professional ideals for nearly
two decades. He published his summary in a 1922 essay55 and in a 1925
book.56 It was slightly modified and adopted by the committee, but one
member of Boston’s committee, Massachusetts lawyer Frank W. Grinnell,
dissented from Jessup’s Summary of the Professional Ideals of the Lawyer.57
Controversies over several proposed supplemental canons led Boston to
move to postpone consideration of the Supplemental Canons. ABA
members agreed. Though Grinnell was the only dissenting voice on the
fifteen-person committee in 1927, the Summary Canon was not among the
proposed additions the following year.58
Five years later, the ABA made additional changes to the Canons of
Ethics.59 For several of these years, including 1933, Charles Boston was
the chairman of the special committee in charge of this project. In addition
to proposed changes, the committee issued a Statement of General Principles of
Legal Ethics.60 Boston’s introduction to the Statement lamented that the ABA
Canons were written only “as applicable to selected situations,” or as
52. See generally Proposed Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, A.B.A. J., May 1927, at 268
(presenting “the text of the Proposed Canons as approved by the majority of” the Special Committee
on Supplementing the Canons of Professional Ethics).
53. Id. at 271–73.
54. Id. at 269 (noting initial proposed supplemental canons, “including a final canon, prepared
by Mr. Henry W. Jessup, summariz[ed], in a generic way, the principles underlying all of the canons”).
55. Henry W. Jessup, The Ethics of the Legal Profession, 101 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
16, 25–29 (1922).
56. HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICS 11–14 (1925).
57. Proposed Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, supra note 52, at 273; see also Report of the
Special Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, 50 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 372, 390–95 (1927)
(dissenting from Jessup’s proposed supplemental Canon and offering a substitute).
58. Important Supplemental Canons of Ethics Proposed, A.B.A. J., May 1928, at 292, 292.
59. Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association Grand Rapids, Michigan,
56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 41, 152–80 (1933).
60. Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, 56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 428, 437–40 (1933).
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“illustrative,” and did not include “a statement of general principles.”61
Though the committee did not recommend the ABA initiate such an effort,
it invited ABA members to consider principles of legal ethics to guide lawyer
behavior.
The principles were based on work done by Boston and Jessup in 1910
for the NYCLA.62 The 1933 iteration of a Summary of Professional Ideals of the
Lawyer consisted of sixteen items.63 These items were framed in relational
terms: among others, lawyer to legal system, lawyer to client, and lawyer to
community.64 The lawyer’s duty to the members of the community in
which the lawyer lived was one of “peculiar responsibility.”65 The lawyer
owed the community the duty to expose judicial corruption, to report for
professional discipline lawyers engaged in professional misconduct, and to
protect the rights and liberties of community members according to law.66
The lawyer was not simply an instrument of a client’s desires, but
responsible for protecting the broader community, nearly all of whom were
not clients.
Boston’s invitation was never taken up by the organized bar.
B. Code of Professional Responsibility (1969)
In 1964, the ABA created a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards.67 Five years later, it adopted the committee’s proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility without amendment.68 The Code consisted of
nine Canons. Within each of the nine Canons the Code listed Ethical
Considerations, aspirational in nature, and Disciplinary Rules, mandatory in

61. Id. at 437.
62. See EDWIN DAVID ROBERTSON, BRETHREN AND SISTERS OF THE BAR: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION 33 (2008) (describing the work done
during 1910); see also Charles A. Boston, The Recent Movement Toward the Realization of High Ideals in the
Legal Profession, 35 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 761, 771–73 (1912) (discussing unsuccessful effort to persuade
NYCLA adopt a code of ethics).
63. See Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, supra note 60, at 439 (providing the sixteen
items that composed the “statement of the professional duties of the lawyer in [New York]”).
64. See id. (addressing the lawyer’s duties to support the law and the lawyer’s relations with
clients and community).
65. Id. (referencing item twelve).
66. Id.
67. Proceedings of the House of Delegates at the 1964 Annual Meeting, 89 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 365, 383
(1964).
68. Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 378,
389–92 (1969).
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nature.69 The Canons included several broad statements of the lawyer’s
duty. For example, Canon 1 indicated, “A Lawyer Should Assist in
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession,” and
Canon 8 stated, “A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.”70
Others completely missed the mark: Canon 3, “A Lawyer Should Assist in
Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,”71 reeked of economic selfinterest rather than protection of the public. Both Canon 4 (“A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client”) and Canon 7 (“A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law”)72 were drafted at a relatively specific level of generality. Both
concerned the broader idea of the extent of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to
clients. In general, these canons offered little in the way of principle.
The Preamble to the Code, on the other hand, was intended to serve as a
statement of professional principles. “[A] free and democratic society”
could exist only when its members believed that justice was possible.73 This
justice was “based upon the rule of law.”74 Lawyers were the “guardians of
the law,”75 making justice possible. As a result, lawyers served a “vital role
in the preservation of society.”76 This vital role included the privilege of
serving as mediators between the state and the individual. The lawyer’s
privileged position in society thus required lawyers not to abuse it for their
benefit. Therefore, lawyers were “to maintain the highest standards of
ethical conduct.”77 Additionally, lawyers needed to be independent of the
state to protect the right and dignity of their clients when the state exercised
power. That required the legal profession to regulate itself. The
“fundamental ethical principles” were the guide for the lawyer, who played
various roles and engaged in difficult tasks that called for the exercise of
sound judgment.78

69. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969) (providing “Ethical
Considerations” and “Disciplinary Rules” in each Canon).
70. Id. at Canons 1, 8.
71. Id. at Canon 3.
72. Id. at Canons 4, 7.
73. Id. at Preamble.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The adoption of the Code without amendment by the House of
Delegates was a harbinger of its general acceptance.79 States and state bar
associations rapidly adopted the Code, and most made few, if any,
changes.80 Yet, by mid-1977, the Code was so roundly criticized that the
ABA created another special committee to draft what became the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1983).81
C. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983)
The initial approach of this second Special Commission on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards (Kutak Commission) was to emphasize the public duties
of the lawyer. It intended to remind lawyers that law was a public
profession. Lawyers owed some duties to the public, in addition to the
duties they owed their clients. When the Model Rules were adopted by the
ABA in 1983, the emphasis shifted to detailing the lawyer’s specific, rulebased duties to clients.82
The Kutak Commission scrapped the three-tiered structure of the Code
for a set of rules stating minimum standards of lawyer conduct. It did,
however, follow the Code and include a Preamble. Like the Code’s
Preamble, the Preamble to the Rules discussed the principles animating the
legal profession. It began: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession,
is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”83 In this last
role:
[The lawyer] should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system,
the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a
79. Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 68, at 389–92.
80. Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 96 ANN.
REP. A.B.A. 676, 676 (1971) (noting thirty-one states, eleven state bar associations, and the District of
Columbia Bar had adopted Code); see id. 96 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 242, 243 (1971) (reporting most states
adopted Code without making any changes).
81. See, e.g., William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, BAR LEADER,
Nov.–Dec. 1977, at 2–3 (discussing reasons, including failure of Code to work as desired, why Spann,
as ABA president, created Kutak Commission to reassess the code and the substantive and procedural
facets of legal ethics).
82. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism,
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 692 (2016) (discussing the history of the Kutak Commission).
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble [1] (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020).
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lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule
of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.84

The Preamble did not create enforceable duties applicable to lawyers. Only
a violation of the rules could subject a lawyer to regulatory discipline. Both
the emphasis on rules and the changing economics of the private practice
of law affected the legal profession’s thinking about broad-based (much less
universally applicable) principles. Lawyers predominantly looked at the
rules in light of the lawyer’s specific duties and standards of conduct when
representing clients. At the forefront of those duties to clients was the duty
of loyalty. This narrower understanding of the lawyer’s responsibility was
one reason why the debates on adding exceptions to the duty not to disclose
client confidences were so hotly contested in the House of Delegates in
2001 and 2003.85
The extent to which a lawyer’s duty of loyalty prevented the disclosure of
client confidences had been fiercely discussed when the Model Rules were
debated in 1983.86 The changes proposed by the ABA’s Ethics 2000
commission returned the issue to the House. Even after the shock of
Enron’s bankruptcy, the dissolution of the Big Five accounting firm Arthur
Andersen, and the bankruptcies of several other high-flying stock market
darlings, the representatives in the House of Delegates strongly disagreed
with one another, as made clear in the narrowness of the votes.87 The
fundamental nature of this dispute and others in the proposed Ethics 2000
amendments may be why the ABA’s summary of the discussion in the
House includes nine uses of the phrase “core values.”88

84. Id. at Preamble [6].
85. See Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 37
(2001) (providing the House debate from 2001); see also Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House
of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 14–18 (2003) (providing the House debate from 2003).
86. Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 289,
295–99 (1983).
87. See supra note 85; see also Ariens, supra note 5, at 295–300 (giving a timeline of events in the
Appendix).
88. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 36–39, 59
(2001) (mentioning “core values” nine times in debate of Ethics 2000 proposed amendments).
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III. CORE VALUES
A. Stirrings
Lawyers did not use the phrase “core values” in relation to the practice
of law or the role of the American legal profession when the Kutak
Commission drafted the Model Rules between 1977 and 1983. The ABA’s
two-year study on the apparent decline in professionalism (and call for its
renewal) in the mid-1980s urged lawyers to adopt the “goals” of “integrity,
competence, fairness, independence, courage and a devotion to the public
interest.”89 It did not discuss core values. Neither did legal ethics writers.
Charles Wolfram’s comprehensive Modern Legal Ethics (1986) begins his
study of the lawyer’s duty to keep confidences by discussing “The
The American Law Institute’s (ALI)
Confidentiality Principle.”90
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, drafted between the mid-1980s and
finally published in 2000, does not appear to use the phrase core values.91
It is barely used in books covered in Google’s Ngram Viewer, though the
number of references increase from nearly nothing to barely something
between 1980 and 2020.92
In legal writings, the phrase “core values” was used occasionally before
1990 to discuss the essential meaning of particular provisions of the
Constitution. For example, in the 1968 case of Pickering v. Board
of Education,93 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, wrote of “[t]he public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance—the core value of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . .”94 “Core values” was
very rarely used to refer to the purpose of the work of lawyers in law review
or bar journal articles before then.95
89. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 111:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 369, 371, 418 (1986). The
report was also published at 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) and as a book. COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
AM. BAR ASS’N, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).
90. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1, at 242 (1986).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. (AM. L. INST. 2000).
92. Search for “Principles, Values, Core Values”, GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER,
https://books.google.com/ngrams/ [https://perma.cc/EL5W-HEW5].
93. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
94. Id. at 573.
95. The exception to this is James Y. Preston, The President’s Message, N.C. ST. BAR Q., Summer
1988, at 2 (discussing “the importance of certain core values for the legal profession—values like
justice, truth and service—as being essential to the survival of the profession and of its practitioners”);
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The change began in a 1990 essay by Geoffrey Hazard96 on The Future of
Legal Ethics.97 Hazard was the most well-known legal ethics scholar of this
time. He served as Reporter to the Kutak Commission from 1978 to
1983.98 In 1984, he became ALI Director, and under his leadership the ALI
began its Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers project.99 Hazard’s
essay argued that the “basic ethical rules of representation” of clients had
remained remarkably stable for two centuries.100 When a lawyer represents
a client, “[t]he rules enforce three core values: loyalty, confidentiality, and
candor to the court.”101 The first two core values “legitimate” the lawyer’s
representation of the client, and the last “legitimates the bar’s affiliation with
the judiciary.”102
Hazard did not further explain. Thus, it is unclear why Hazard
distinguished confidentiality from loyalty, for a lawyer keeps a client’s (and
former client’s) confidences to demonstrate the lawyer’s loyalty to the client.
It is also unclear whether Hazard’s understanding of core values refers to
the values of the legal profession, the values held by some subset of lawyers
(litigators?), an individual lawyer’s beliefs, or as values clients desire their
lawyers to possess. Hazard’s description of the profession’s core values was
largely ignored until the late 1990s, when the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice adopted both the phrase and Hazard’s core values
of loyalty and confidentiality.103

see also Robert G. Baynes, The President’s Message, N.C. ST. BAR Q., Fall 1988, at 2 (noting his
predecessor’s (Preston’s) emphasis on core values that all lawyers accept, but not naming such values).
96. Hazard was the reporter for the Kutak Commission that drafted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the director of the American Law Institute when it initiated (and throughout)
its Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers project, co-author of The Law of Lawyering (GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed., 2014)), co-author of a popular casebook
on legal ethics, and the preeminent legal ethics authority of his time. See Stephen Gillers, Hazard,
Geoffrey C., Jr., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 259 (Roger K.
Newman ed., 2009); see also In Memoriam: Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A.L.I. REP., Spring 2018, at 1, 4–5
(honoring Hazard).
97. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1246 (1991).
98. See supra note 96.
99. See supra note 96.
100. Hazard, supra note 97, at 1246.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083,
1092–93 (2000) (noting idea of core values and listing confidentiality, loyalty, and competence and
adding the negative core value of “being as nasty as we can be”).
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B. The MacCrate Report and Fundamental Values
In 1992, the Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
issued the Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap, known as the MacCrate Report.104 Its mission was to identify ways
in which law schools and the legal profession could work together to ease
the transition of law students to the practice of law. To do so, the Task
Force recognized that “it was not possible to consider how to ‘bridge’ or
‘narrow’ the alleged ‘gap’ between law schools and the practicing bar without
first identifying the fundamental skills and values that every lawyer should
acquire” before practicing law.105 It seconded this idea by declaring, at its
outset, “the law has remained a single profession identified with a perceived
common body of learning, skills and values.”106 The Task Force
acknowledged its inability to draft “a comprehensive statement of skills and
values that all members of the profession would—or could reasonably be
expected to—accept as definitive.”107 Even so, it was useful for the
progress of the American legal profession to begin the process.108 In
addition to ten fundamental lawyering skills, the MacCrate Report listed four
“[f]undamental [v]alues of the [p]rofession”: 1) “Provision of Competent
Representation; 2) ”Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness and Morality”;
3) “Striving to Improve the Profession”; and 4) “Professional SelfDevelopment.”109
These “fundamental values” do not overlap the three “core values” listed
by Hazard. Additionally, the MacCrate Report’s four fundamental values
substantially overlap one another. The duty to provide competent
representation has much in common with the duty to engage in professional
self-development. The value of striving to promote justice overlaps with all
of the other values. Incompetently representing a client is a form of injustice
and demonstrates a failure to develop one’s professional abilities. It also
detracts from the capacity of legal institutions to do justice.

104. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. Robert MacCrate served as the chair of the task force. Id. at v.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 123.
108. See id. at 124 (describing the benefits of composing a statement regarding the “nature of
the skills and values that are central to the role and functioning of lawyers in practice”).
109. Id. at 140–41, 207–21 (offering detailed statements of four fundamental values).
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Two notable articles—further described below—discussed core values of
the American legal profession in the mid-1990s, neither of which made any
reference to Hazard. Both were concerned with the ongoing issue
of what lawyer professionalism meant, especially in a market-driven legal
profession.
In a 1995 speech on professionalism, former
ABA President George Bushnell discussed the “core values . . . [of]
ensuring access to justice for all persons and defending the sanctity of our
Constitution . . . .”110 Both were threatened by Congress, the former by
attacks on legal services for the poor, and the latter by proposals to amend
the Constitution.111 The latter threats included efforts to overturn Supreme
Court precedents protecting the right to burn an American flag and allowing
public schools to require students to pray.112 Such threats to the First
Amendment rights to speech and religion would “cripple our freedoms and
subject us all to a more authoritarian government.”113
A 1994 essay in the ABA publication, Business Law Today, was titled
Reclaiming Our Core Values.114 Author Ronald Kessel, the managing partner
of Palmer and Dodge, a large Boston firm, sought a renewed sense of
professional community. Too often, law firms had fallen into the trap of
valuing the “limited” currency of “dollars and billable hours.”115 This made
the practice of law more like work in a nineteenth century sweatshop than a
professional endeavor. Law firms would be well served by a “revitalized
institutional commitment to professional values and the professional
growth of its lawyers.”116 Kessel did not define the contours of “core” or
“professional” values; for him, the heart of the matter was the imbalance
caused lawyers by a focus on monetary rewards.
C. Core Values and Lawyer Ethics, 1997–2003
In 1997, ABA President Jerome Shestak dedicated his year of service to
fulfilling the profession’s “fundamental professional values,”117 building on
110. George E. Bushnell, Jr., Francis X. Riley Lecture on Professionalism, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 4
(1995).
111. Id. at 4–5.
112. Id. at 5–6.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Ronald H. Kessel, Reclaiming Our Core Values, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 6.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id.
117. Jerome J. Shestack, Putting Our Professional Values to Work, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 8; see
also Jerome J. Shestack, Defining Our Calling, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 8, 8 (calling for lawyers to
“enhance[] our professionalism”).
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the recommendations made in the MacCrate Report. In his inaugural
speech, he argued, “rapid changes in the profession and technology make a
comprehensive study and review necessary to take the legal profession into
the next century.”118 He therefore urged the creation of a Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards (Ethics 2000).119 Shestak returned to
this theme in this swan song. Shestak asked ABA members to “commit to
the essential values and conduct that make a lawyer worthy of being called
a professional”; he did not examine in detail which values were essential or
fundamental.120
Shestak’s successor, Philip Anderson, began his term by noting the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants was readying adoption
of its vision statement, which had “a distinctly market-oriented bent.”121
Further, this vision statement perceived growth not in the areas of taxation
and accounting, work traditionally done by accountants, but in “consulting
services, including legal services.”122 Anderson also noted that four of the
five largest employers of lawyers were accounting firms.123 The Big Five
accounting firms looked ready to enter the “legal consulting” market,124 in
effect, the practice of law. This possibility was a threat to those large firms
that competed with the Big Five. Anderson decided to create a Commission
It was to recommend whether
on Multidisciplinary Practice.125
organizations in which both legal and other services were offered, and which
were owned by lawyers and other nonlawyer service providers, should be
permitted in the Rules of Professional Conduct.126 If so, this would alter
or abolish Rule 5.4(b)’s ban on nonlawyer ownership of entities in which
the practice of law occurred. It was given less than a year to report back.

118. James Podgers, Model Rules Get the Once-Over, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 90, 90 (quoting
Shestack).
119. Id. The formal name of the Commission was Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and popularly known as the Ethics 2000 Commission. See id. (using the names
interchangeably).
120. Jerome J. Shestak, Taking Professionalism Seriously, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 70, 70.
121. Philip S. Anderson, We All Must Be Accountable, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 6, 6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. John Gibeaut & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze: Commission Appointed to Assess Threat from
Accountants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 88, 88 (noting the creation of a commission in response to efforts
by accounting firms to enter markets long thought by lawyers to be theirs alone).
125. Id.
126. See id. (describing the issue the commission would assess and indicating it would
recommend a response to the House of Delegates).
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The Multidisciplinary Practice Commission met its deadline. Its Report
favored amending Model Rule 5.4 to permit lawyers and nonlawyers jointly
to own an MDP.127 The Commission recommended this change on the
condition that the bar “protect its core values, independence of professional
judgment, protection of confidential client information, and loyalty to the
client through the avoidance of conflicts of interest . . . .”128 The last two,
of course, were values listed by Hazard in his 1990 essay;129 Hazard was a
member of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.130
Independence of professional judgment, not Hazard’s “candor to the
court,” was the Commission’s third core value.131 It seems likely that listing
this core value was more a consequence of the issue before the Commission
than an effort to displace candor as a core value.
Most states created similar commissions.132 The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (City Bar) was one. The City Bar responded
favorably to the initial report of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice in support of amending the Model Rules, though it added more
core values:
MDPs should be permitted, but only under a regime that requires MDPs to
respect and preserve the core values of the legal profession—independence
of judgment, loyalty to the client, preservation of confidences, competence,
avoiding improper solicitation, and support for pro bono legal services and
improving the legal system.133

127. Report, supra note 21, at 223; see also Debra Baker, View from the Other Side, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1999, at 83, 83 (quoting Lawrence Fox at the February 1999 ABA Midyear Meeting in opposition
to MDPs: “The whole notion that all of our core values shall be destroyed sends shivers through
me . . . ”).
128. Report, supra note 21, at 223. The report continues and gives a detailed description of itself.
Id. at 225–32 (discussing the report in detail).
129. See supra notes 96–97, 101 (describing Hazard’s 1990 essay).
130. Report, supra note 21, at 232 (listing members).
131. Id. at 223.
132. George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis
of Inter-Professional Competition, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 857 n.21 (2006) (noting “forty-four states and
the District of Columbia” created commissions on the subject).
133. Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, 54 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 585, 596
(1999). The list is written slightly differently by its Executive Committee. Id. at 589 (including
“decision-making” as part of independence of judgment and adding “avoidance of conflicts of interest”
to the core value of loyalty to the client, and “maintaining the independence and integrity of the judicial
system” to the last duty noted).
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The Florida Bar issued a report recommending the ABA not act on the
Commission’s recommendation until further study was completed and
demonstrated that this change would not adversely affect the values of
lawyer independence and the duty of client loyalty. It argued the
Commission had not thoroughly evaluated whether the public understood
and supported this change to “a fundamental value of the independence of
the profession.”134 The ABA agreed to the delay.
The Commission returned with the same recommendation in 2000.135 It
again made its recommendation with the proviso that the profession protect
the public interest and the “core values of the legal profession.”136 It added
two core values, “competence, . . . and pro bono publico obligations,” to the
three listed in its report the previous year.137 It also tartly informed the
House of Delegates that the study proposed by the Florida Bar was
infeasible.138
The Commission’s recommendation triggered a disagreement in the
House of Delegates about who better understood and interpreted the core
values of the legal profession.139 Those supporting the Commission’s
recommendation lost by a nearly 3–1 margin.140 Its recommendation was
displaced by a resolution reaffirming the majority’s understanding of core
values. The House resolved that each jurisdiction “implement the following
principles and preserve the core values of the legal profession.”141 The six
core values the House listed were: 1) a “duty of undivided loyalty to the
134. Report of the Florida Bar, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 753, 754 (1999).
135. Multidisciplinary Report, supra note 25, at 183; see also Report, supra note 21, at 223–25
(mentioning “core values” nine times in the 2000 debate on multidisciplinary firms); Fox, supra note 29,
at 547–48 (alluding to the Commission’s recommendation and its alleged connection to protecting core
values). The MacCrate Report is discussed in “Professionalism and the Lawyer’s Role,” above.
Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 27, at 26 (indicating MacCrate led
effort in the House of Delegates to keep the ABA ethics rules ban on multidisciplinary firms).
136. Multidisciplinary Report, supra note 25, at 183.
137. Id. at 183. The Commission noted: “It is undeniable that competence is a core value of
the profession and the Commission’s original recommendation should have so identified it.” Id. at 188.
On pro bono, it declared: “Through recognizing that pro bono service is not mandatory, the
Commission nevertheless believes it is a core value of the legal profession.” Id. at 190.
138. Id. at 192–93.
139. See Report of the Illinois Bar Association Presented Jointly with the New Jersey State Bar Association,
125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 343, 343, 345 (2000) (offering a “statement of principles” that included four
“core values”: undivided loyalty to clients, competence, keeping client confidences inviolate, and duty
to avoid conflicts of interest with a client); see also id. at 345 (referencing the MacCrate report).
140. See John Gibeaut, ‘It’s a Done Deal’: House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 2000, at 92, 92 (noting the vote against the proposal was 314–106).
141. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 24 (2000).
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client”; 2) a “duty competently to exercise independent legal judgment” on
a client’s behalf; 3) a duty to keep client confidences inviolate; 4) a duty to
avoid a conflict of interest with a client; 5) a duty to “maintain a single
profession of law with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special
responsibilit[ies] for the quality of justice; and” 6) a “duty to promote access
to justice.”142
A leader in the House who rejected MDPs was Robert MacCrate, a
former ABA president for whom the MacCrate Report was named. As a
former president, MacCrate was permitted to make a report to delegates
opposing the Commission’s recommendation.143 He noted the work of the
Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation of
the New York State Bar Association, which he served as chairperson.144 Its
report was titled, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession.145
The committee listed seven core values. Four were fiduciary duties owed to
clients (confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, independent judgment,
and competence), and three were duties “arising” from the lawyer’s role in
the adversary and governmental systems (advocacy, access to legal services,
and “[t]he independent legal profession and the rule of law”).146
The MDP debate in the ABA and in state bar associations had generated
a broad discussion of the contours of the legal profession’s core values. The
June 2000 issue of the Minnesota Law Review (that is, after the ABA’s 1999
delay and before its reconsideration of MDPs in 2000) published articles
from a symposium on multidisciplinary practice, core values, and the future
of the legal profession. One contribution looked closely at the core values
issue, similarly to the New York State Bar Association. The authors asked,
what were the profession’s core values from the perspectives of 1) clients,
and 2) society?147 They listed several core values from each perspective.
To effectuate the client’s interests, a lawyer had to be competent, truthful
142. Id. Promoting access to justice was one of Bushnell’s core values, as discussed in his 1995
lecture. See supra note 110.
143. Report of Robert MacCrate, Former President, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 603 (2000).
144. Id. at 604.
145. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE L. GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE & OPERATION, N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS’N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (2000),
https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2020/01/MACRATEREPORTAccessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2GA4-GJ83].
146. Id. at 309–24.
147. James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical” Proposal to
Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1186 (2000).
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and honest, keep client confidences, and exercise independent judgment for
the benefit of the client.148 Regarding this last core value, a lawyer was
unable to exercise independent judgment if there existed a conflict of
interest with the client.149 To meet society’s interests, the lawyer needs to
abide by the law, speak candidly and truthfully to any tribunal, speak
truthfully to adversaries and third parties, provide access to the system of
justice, and “work to improve the system of justice.”150
The 2003 House of Delegates debate whether to add two exceptions to
Rule 1.6 protecting client confidences brought more heat than light to the
core values question. The duty to keep “inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients” had long
been one of the “duties specifically enjoined by law on attorneys,” as
Thomas Goode Jones wrote in 1887.151 This inviolate duty was
accompanied by the common law crime-fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege. This exception applied when a lawyer’s services were used
to permit a person to commit what the client knew or reasonably should
have known was a crime or fraud.152 “Inviolate” may not have been quite
the right word.
At the end of these two debates, the following had been nominated as
professional core values:
•

Competence, including a “duty competently
independent legal judgment” on a client’s behalf;

•

Confidentiality, sometimes referred to as the duty to keep
confidences “inviolate”;

•

Undivided loyalty to client, sometimes reflected in a duty to avoid
any conflict of interest with the client;

to

exercise

148. Id. at 1187.
149. Id. at 1187–88.
150. Id. at 1188–89.
151. Jones, supra note 40, at 46–47 (listing, as the fourth duty of seven, to “maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients”); see ABA Code
of Ethics, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 567, 585 (1908) (listing as the fifth oath provision: “I will maintain the
confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client . . . ”).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 82 (AM. L. INST. 2000),
which differs slightly from proposed, but rejected, FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(1) (1975) (“[S]ervices of the
lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud . . . .”).
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•

A duty to exercise “independent judgment” on behalf of the client;

•

A duty to be truthful and honest with one’s clients;

•

Avoiding improper solicitation;

•

Candor to the court, also stated as a duty to speak candidly and
truthfully to any tribunal;

•

A duty of advocacy arising from the lawyer’s role in the adversary
system;

•

Professional self-development;

•

Providing pro bono publico services;

•

Striving to promote justice, fairness and morality;

•

Contributing to the profession’s fulfillment of its responsibility to
enhance the capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice;

•

A “duty to promote access to justice” or to “provide” access to the
system of justice;

•

A duty to work to improve the system of justice;

•

A duty to maintain “a single profession of law with responsibilities
as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a
public citizen having special responsibilit[ies] for the quality of
justice”;

•

A duty to promote access to legal services;

•

A duty to maintain the independent legal profession and the rule of
law; and

•

A duty to abide by the law.153

There was pushback. Professor Nathan Crystal closely assessed four of
the six core values listed in the ABA’s resolution in 2000 and found them
wanting.
This list had “rhetorical appeal but is fundamentally
154
Additionally, “reliance on the core values of the
misleading.”

153. See, e.g., supra notes 141–52 and accompanying text (describing the debates and core values
nominated during the debates).
154. Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748 (2001).
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profession” harms those of moderate means in need of legal services.155
The ABA ignored his critical, well-reasoned analysis.
D. Core Values and the ABA, 2000–2010
The ABA Journal publishes a column from its president in each issue.
Most reflect the president’s particular goals or the ABA’s mission. From
2000 through 2010, many ABA presidents favorably discussed the
importance of protecting and enhancing the legal profession’s core values
in one or more monthly columns.156 Nearly all did so without referring to
any particular core values. One exception was H. Thomas Wells, Jr., who
served as president from 2008–2009. Wells’s objective as president was to
foster four core values that “all lawyers share”: “access to justice,
independence of the bar and judiciary, diversity and the rule of law.”157 All
concerned institutional core values, an expected focus. The core value of
“diversity” was the only one of these four core values new to the list.
Wells included diversity in response to the decision of the ABA House of
Delegates to “reform[] its goals and mission” in 2008.158 Its mission was

155. Id.
156. See Carolyn B. Lamm, Help Spread the Word: Inform Your Colleagues of Benefits and Public Service
Aspects of ABA Membership, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2009, at 9, 9 (reflecting on how ABA members serve the
profession and the public); Next in Line: Michael Greco Begins His Term as ABA President-Elect, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 2004, at 76, 76 (quoting new president, Michael Greco); Dennis W. Archer, Times Have Changed:
Join My Family, Our ABA Family in Improving the Justice System and the World, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 8, 8
(describing a core value he resolved to focus on); Alfred P. Carlton Jr., Of Time and Independence:
After 9-11 and the Business Debacles of Recent History, Our Country Needs Us, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 10, 10
(emphasizing the importance of “hold[ing] fast to the core values” of the legal profession);
Martha W. Barnett, Professionalism Pays, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 10, 10 (describing how law firms
should use the values of “[c]haracter, [c]ompetence and [c]ommitment” to guide their operations);
William G. Paul, ABA—A Home for All Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 8, 8 (“[A]ll lawyers share core
values and professional obligations, and have a duty to do the work of the profession.”);
William G. Paul, A Vision for Our Profession, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 8, 8 (“[O]ur core values [should]
never change because they set us apart as a profession and are critical to the preservation of our free
society.”).
157. Wells, supra note 30, at 9; H. Thomas Wells Jr., Common Core Values, BAR LEADER,
Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 16, 16.
158. See COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PRO., AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III
REPORT: THE STATE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1
(2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity-portal/2011r_e_
goal3_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDW-NWUG] (discussing the history of the ABA’s reforming
its mission and goals); AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III REPORT 2020: THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF
THE ABA’S LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERS 5 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/diversity-inclusion-center/2020_goal_iii_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3AV-
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to “serve equally our members, our profession and the public by defending
liberty and delivering justice as the national representative of the legal
profession.”159 The four goals adopted to meet this mission were: serve
our members, improve our profession, “[e]liminate [b]ias and [e]nhance
[d]iversity,” and “[a]dvance the [r]ule of [l]aw.”160 The two objectives of
diversity (Goal III) were: “[p]romote full and equal participation in the
association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons,” and
“[e]liminate bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”161
The extent to which these goals were to inform other decisions of the
House of Delegates was uncertain. At the February 2010 ABA Midyear
Meeting, the House adopted a recommendation that the ABA examine how
third parties (such as U.S. News & World Report) ranked law firms (a new
project) and law schools (an old project).162 The initial recommendation
suggested lawyers “consider whether such rankings promote diversity, pro
bono activities and other ‘core values’ of the profession.”163 These
particular considerations were dropped from the resolution by a vote of
203–183.164
Another measure of the importance of core values language in the ABA
was its reaffirmation in 2007 of the core values of pro bono publico work and
the independence of the bar from the government. In January 2007, a senior
Department of Defense official encouraged general counsel at Fortune 500
companies to jettison law firms and lawyers who also represented alleged
terrorists and Guantanamo detainees on a pro bono basis.165 The
organized bar and the House of Delegates responded immediately. A group
of thirty bar associations and ABA sections and committees proposed five
resolutions condemning this attack on lawyers at the ABA’s February 2007
meeting.166 The first resolution affirmed the ABA’s “commitment to the
TBFH] (describing how, “[i]n 2008, the House of Delegates voted to revise the Association’s goals to
ensure that the rights of other underrepresented groups could be addressed”).
159. ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 31.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Proceedings of the 2010 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 135:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1,
40–44 (2010).
163. Edward A. Adams, Rankings to Get ABA Review, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2010, at 66, 66.
164. Id.
165. See James Podgers, Engaged from the Start, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2007, at 64, 66 (commenting on
remarks made by a “senior official at the Pentagon” to the corporations); see Lawrence J. Fox,
The ABA—A Beacon for Our Clients, 2007 PRO. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 9, 15 (2007) (discussing event).
166. See Report of the New York State Bar Association et al., 132:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 479, 479–81
(2007) (listing thirty sponsors of the resolutions) [hereinafter NYSBA Report].
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core values of the legal profession, including commitment to pro bono
provision of legal services to those in need and the commitment to the
independence of the profession, provided that this does not negate existing
ABA policy regarding any governmental obligation to provide counsel.”167
The four other resolutions were also adopted after modest amendments.
They included praise for those courageous lawyers willing to “provide pro
bono legal services to disfavored individuals and groups.”168 The House
also condemned “any governmental attack on the independence of the
profession that encourages clients to exert improper influence over their
lawyers’ choice of other clients, or to penalize lawyers for representing
unpopular or controversial clients.”169 As the chair of the ABA Criminal
Justice Section reminded his readers: “The unique and important role of an
independent bar in protecting and defending liberty is more, not less,
important than ever before.”170 Those lawyers fighting “for the rights of
the ‘worst of the worst[]’ . . . demonstrated fidelity to the rule of law, the
Constitution of the United States, and fundamental principles of
international law.”171
E. Ethics 20/20 and Core Values, 2009–2012
In 2009, Carolyn Lamm followed Wells as ABA president. Like Shestak
(and others) before her, she argued a review of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was necessary to “keep pace with societal change”
and with the “accelerating pace of technological innovation.”172 She
created an Ethics 20/20 Commission to recommend changes, if any, to the
Model Rules.

167. Id. at 480; Proceedings of the 2007 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 132:1 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 1, 22–23 (2007).
168. NYSBA Report, supra note 166, at 480. Proceedings of the 2007 Midyear Meeting of the House of
Delegates, supra note 167, at 23.
169. NYSBA Report, supra note 166, at 481.
170. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Importance of an Independent Bar, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2008, at 1,
20.
171. Id. at 22.
172. See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE 1–2
(Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/pre
liminary_issues_outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CCG-VKJF] (indicating “Lamm created the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20” to assess the Model Rules in light of modern developments); Carolyn
Lamm, Now More than Ever: ABA Will Continue Providing Guidance, Delivering Benefits to Boost the Profession,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 9, 9 (“We need to review our system of legal governance and ethical regulations
to keep up with a changing world.”).
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The Ethics 20/20 Commission possessed the authority to undertake a
“plenary review and assessment of the Model Rules” in light of these
changes.173 The Commission was to “be guided by three principles:
protecting the public [interest], preserving core professional values of the
American legal profession [(otherwise left undefined)], and maintaining a
strong, independent, and self-regulating profession.”174 Its preliminary
outline focused on the impact of state regulation of lawyers engaged in the
multijurisdictional practice of law, the effect of changes in technology on
the globalization of the practice of law, and ethics issues affected by
technology.175
In a December 2, 2011 memorandum and report, Ethics 20/20
announced its decision to continue the ban on most types of
multidisciplinary practice structures, now referred to as “alternative law
practice structures” (ALPS).176 The Commission left open the possibility
of a very “limited form of . . . nonlawyer ownership” in a law firm.177 The
Commission declared this possibility was “more restrictive than” the type
of (restrictive) nonlawyer ownership the District of Columbia had permitted
for over twenty years.178 The mere possibility of an ALPS was sufficient
to rouse the opposition. The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), joined
by other associations, filed a resolution asking the House to re-affirm its
2000 decision to ban any form of multidisciplinary practice.179
173. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 172, at 1–2.
174. Id. at 2.
175. See generally id. (outlining the issues).
176. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on
Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (state, loc., specialty & int’l), Law Schools, &
Individuals
1–2
(Dec. 2,
2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCT5-7C
6U].
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id.; see Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/standingcommitteeonprofessionalism2/resour
ces/ethics2020hompeage/ [https://perma.cc/ND69-P6LX] (“The Commission already has ruled out
certain forms of nonlawyer ownership that currently exist in other countries. In particular, the
Commission rejected: (a) publicly traded law firms, (b) outside nonlawyer investment or ownership in
law firms, and (c) multidisciplinary practices (i.e., law firms that offer both legal and non-legal services
separately in a single entity). This Discussion Draft relates to a very limited form of nonlawyer
ownership in a law firm akin to, but more restrictive than, that which has been permitted for 21 years
in the District of Columbia.”).
179. See generally ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2000),
https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/blog/2012/08/isba-raises-issue-nonlawyer-ownership-lawfirms-aba-house-delegates/joint_isba_sr_lawyers_div_resolution%20authcheckdam.pdf [https://per
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ISBA President John Thies raised the stakes: “[T]his is about defending the
core values of our profession against the encroachment of non-lawyers—to
the detriment of clients. It’s gratifying that so many other states are lining
up behind us, and I expect this to continue as we approach the ABA meeting
in August.”180 Even after Ethics 20/20 decided in April to make no
proposal permitting lawyers to form any ALPS in which legal services would
be provided,181 the ISBA continued to press its resolution in August.
Agreeing were nine general counsel of large corporations. They declared,
“allowing any form of non-lawyer ownership of law firms will harm the core
values of the American legal profession.”182 These counsel explicitly
referred to the core values adopted in 2000.183 Although the ISBA’s
resolution was formally postponed rather than adopted, it won. No change
was made. And the reason appeared to be the defense of the profession’s
“core values.”184 Of course, the co-chairs of Ethics 20/20 had pledged to
maintain the core values of the profession as one of its principles. Aligning
these competing claims of core values was becoming less likely.

ma.cc/BD7Z-JD2F] (stating the “resolution would reaffirm certain core principles and values of the
legal profession” that the House adopted in 2000).
180. Chris Bonjean, ISBA Submits Resolution Regarding ABA’s Ethics 20/20, ILL. ST. BAR ASS’N
(June 20, 2012), https://www.isba.org/barnews/2012/06/20/isba-submits-resolution-regarding-ab
as-ethics-2020 [https://perma.cc/6QHS-TZBD ] (quoting Thies).
181. James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 Commission Shelves Nonlawyer Ownership, Focuses on
Other Proposals, A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 27, 27, 29; see Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael
Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (state, loc.,
specialty & int’l), Law Schools, & Individuals 7 (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111228_summary_of_ethics_20_20_commissi
on_actions_december_2011_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58H-Y86B] (indicating the Commission
rejected such proposals).
182. Email from Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, Gen. Couns. & Sec’y, Cisco Sys., Inc.
et al. to Commission Members, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, at 1 (Feb. 29, 2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comme
nts/ninegeneralcounselcomments_alpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q3V5-56TM].
183. Id. at 2.
184. See James E. Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Successfully Achieved Its Mission: It “Protected, Preserved,
and Maintained”, 47 AKRON L. REV. 149, 157–58 (2014) (discussing the controversy and Thies’s
invocation of the profession’s “core values”); see also Proceedings of the 2012 Annual Meeting of the House of
Delegates, 137:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 6 (2012) (postponing consideration of Resolution 10A).
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IV. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(G)
A. History of Anti-Discrimination Ethics Proposals, 1992–2013
Model Rule 8.4(g) went from idea to adoption in less than two years’ time,
and from first to final (fifth) version in just over a year. This is quick in
ABA policymaking. Its origins, and the interest of many in the ABA to add
some type of anti-discrimination provision in the Model Rules, began much
earlier.
The 1992 MacCrate Report’s second fundamental professional value was
to strive “to [p]romote [j]ustice, [f]airness, and [m]orality.”185 In its
Commentary on this value, the Report discussed how important it was for
lawyers to accord “appropriate dignity and respect to all people with whom
one interacts in a professional capacity.”186 More specifically, that duty
“necessarily includes refraining from sexual harassment and from any form
of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual
orientation, age, or disability, in one’s professional interactions with clients,
witnesses, support staff, and other individuals.”187 It cited New York and
Minnesota lawyer ethics provisions in support of its conclusion; the latter,
adopted in 1989, stated, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color,
national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection
with a lawyer’s professional activities.”188
In 1992, the ABA’s Task Force on Minorities and the Justice System
issued its report, Achieving Justice in a Diverse America.189 One suggestion of
the Task Force was that the Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility draft a rule of professional conduct making it misconduct to
engage in certain types of discriminatory behavior.190 At the February 1994
Midyear Meeting of the ABA, the Committee recommended adding new
paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4.191 Its recommendation made it
misconduct for a lawyer, “in the course of representing a client,” to
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 140.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. (quoting MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1989)).
TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES & THE JUST. SYS., AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN
A DIVERSE AMERICA (1992).
190. Id. at 26.
191. Report No. 3 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 119:1 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 106, 106 (1994) [hereinafter Report No. 3].
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“knowingly manifest by words or conduct . . . bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”192 The Committee also proposed a new comment that
concluded “[d]iscriminatory conduct . . . generally viewed as unacceptable
manifests a lack of respect for the law and undermines a lawyer’s
professionalism.”193
The Committee’s proposal closely tracked Canon 3B(6) of the ABA’s
1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3B(6) mandated a judge to
“require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic
status,” toward any person connected with the litigation.194 (Canon 3B(5)
required the same of the judge in the performance of judicial duties.)195
Though the Committee did not appear to break much new ground, given
its reliance on language found in an existing Canon of Judicial Conduct, the
recommendation was withdrawn before discussion in the hope that a
proposal “commanding general support” could be offered the following
year.196 The Young Lawyers Division (YLD) had offered its own
paragraph (g) at the same meeting, which was also withdrawn. The YLD
proposal was both slightly narrower and significantly broader than the
Committee’s. Its proposal was narrower in the activities it proscribed. Only
those actions that constituted a “discriminatory act prohibited by law” or
conduct that harassed a person based on race, gender and other attributes
was misconduct.197 It was broader because it applied to “discrimination or
harassment . . . in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities,” not
192. Id.
193. Id.; ARTHUR H. GARWIN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2013, at 855 (2013).
194. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004); See Report No. 3,
supra note 191, at 109 (quoting Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(6): “A judge shall require
lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.”); Canon 3B(6) is now found, as slightly
amended, in MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (adding “or
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to” after “prejudice,” and
adding ethnicity, marital status, gender, and political affiliation to the list of attributes).
195. Canon 3B(5) used the same language and created the same duty as applied to the judges
themselves. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
196. Proceedings of the 1994 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 119:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 18
(1994).
197. Report No. 1 of the Young Lawyers Division, 119:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 353, 353 (1994).
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merely when representing a client.198 It was also broader than the
Committee’s proposal because it omitted any exceptions. The Committee
had included exceptions relating to “a lawyer’s confidential communications
to a client” and when engaged in “legitimate advocacy.”199
The hope for a revised paragraph (g) in time for the February 1995
meeting went unrealized, due to a change in view by the Committee.200 It
decided a “policy statement” was preferable to a rule of professional
conduct, and this halfway proposition was both acceded to by the YLD and
adopted by the House at its August 1995 meeting.201 The YLD officially
proposed a resolution condemning discrimination by lawyers, which it
recognized as “aspirational.”202 This policy statement, the ABA Resolution
Against Bias and Prejudice, consisted of five parts.203 The first part meshed
the previously withdrawn proposals of the YLD and the Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility. As amended, it
condemns the manifestation by lawyers in the course of their professional
activities, by words or conduct, of bias or prejudice against clients, opposing
parties and their counsel, other litigants, witnesses, judges and court
personnel, jurors and others, based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status, unless such words
or conduct are otherwise permissible as legitimate advocacy on behalf of a
client or a cause.204

198. Id.
199. Compare id. (providing a draft rule that did not include exceptions), with Report No. 3, supra
note 191, at 106 (providing a draft rule including exceptions).
200. See Report No. 1 of the Criminal Justice Section, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 207, 210 (1998)
[hereinafter Criminal Justice Section] (recounting the history of recommended amendments to Model
Rule 8.4 and noting “the Standing Committee subsequently shifted its position, instead favoring a
policy statement over a rule”).
201. Id.
202. Report No. 3 of the Young Lawyers Division, 120:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 445, 445 (1995); see also
Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, 120:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 2, 61 (1995) (revising and
approving the “aspirational” policy statement); GARWIN, supra note 193, at 856 (discussing the 1995
policy statement).
203. See Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, supra note 202, at 61–62 (providing
the text of the resolution).
204. Id. at 61. The other provisions condemned 1) “discrimination by lawyers in the
management or operation of a law practice,” and 2) threatening, harassing, or intimidating others in
any setting, not merely doing so with some connection to the practice of law; and 3) discouraged
lawyers from joining organizations that engaged in “invidious discrimination” regarding the
“aforementioned categories;” and 4) encouraged “affirmative steps such as continuing education . . .
to discourage the speech and conduct described above.” Id. at 61–62.
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This policy statement generally accepted the broader reach of both the YLD
and Committee’s proposals. It followed the Committee in applying to
“words or conduct” that demonstrated “bias or prejudice,” not merely “a
discriminatory act prohibited by law” or harassment.205 It adopted the
broader YLD proposal by condemning acts of lawyers “in the course of
their professional activities,” not the subset of activities “in the course of
representing a client,” as the Committee proposed.206 It was slightly
narrower than YLD’s 1994 proposal in allowing an exception for “legitimate
advocacy” for client or cause, but did not include the Committee’s other
exception, confidential communications to a client.207
Three years later, the Criminal Justice Section proposed adding a
paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4, consisting of two subsections.208 This
relatively narrow proposal applied only “in the course of representing a
client,” only to a “verbal or physical discriminatory act, on account of race,
ethnicity, or gender,” and only when such conduct was directed at those
connected with the litigation, such as other litigants and witnesses.209 The
proposal was divided into two sections, applying 1) if the lawyer intended
to abuse persons or gain a tactical advantage, or 2) “if such conduct
constitutes harassment.”210 The Section also proposed adding five
Comments. Its proposed Comment [8] stated:
[The rule excludes] a lawyer’s advocating the racist, sexist, or otherwise
discriminatory views of a client, in or out of court, or the lawyer’s advocating
his own discriminatory view, no matter how offensive, in bar speeches,
corporate board meetings, church meetings, published writings, civic
association functions, or other avenues of expression in the lawyer’s personal
life, or in his professional life outside of client representation.211

This and the other limitations of the proposed rule (it did not apply to
confidential communications or to a lawyer’s decision whom to represent),
the Section argued, best protected both the constitutional freedom of
lawyers and clients to speak and the “fair and efficient workings of the
205. Compare id. at 61 (using broader language), with Report No. 1 of the Young Lawyers Division,
supra note 197, at 353 (using narrower language).
206. See Report No. 3, supra note 191, at 106 (providing the Committee proposal).
207. See supra note 199 (discussing the proposals).
208. Criminal Justice Section, supra note 200, at 207.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 208.
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justice system.”212 The Section’s final Comment reminded lawyers that
conduct not within this rule would be “inconsistent with what it means to
be an officer of the court,” and referenced the ABA’s 1995 Resolution
Against Bias and Prejudice.213
In its Report in support of this supplemental provision and commentary,
the Criminal Justice Section noted that sixteen states and the District of
Columbia had adopted some ethics code provision discouraging or
prohibiting “lawyer race, gender, ethnicity, or other category-based
discrimination, or lawyer manifestations of bias or prejudice.”214 Those
statements varied widely in scope, including some that arguably raised
“concerns about free speech and lawyers’ ability to earn a living.”215 The
Section’s goal was to provide, without raising constitutional concerns,
“some teeth in the form of a disciplinary rule,” for a policy statement was
simply ineffective in regulating discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
ethnicity.216
The Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was also back
that year with a proposal to add a new Comment [2] (later renumbered as
Comment [3]) to Rule 8.4.217 This proposed Comment was nearly identical
to Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(6), and intentionally so. The
Committee believed the language adopted by the House in 1990 “best
effectuate[d]” the ABA’s Resolution Against Bias and Prejudice.218
Adopting the language of Canon 3B(6) also meant proposed Comment [2]
was nearly identical to the Committee’s 1994 proposal, including limiting its
scope to behavior in “representing a client.”219 The proposed Comment
exempted “legitimate advocacy,” but did not include an exception from
discipline for confidential communications with clients.220

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 209.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 211.
217. Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
81, 81 (1998).
218. Id. at 82.
219. Id. at 81.
220. Id.
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Both proposals were withdrawn before discussion in the House,221 but
the issue returned in August 1998.222 The House adopted the Committee’s
amended addition of new Comment [2].223 The amendment added the final
sentence to protect lawyers in criminal practice.224 As approved, it stated,
[2] A lawyer, who in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status, violates
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate
paragraph (d). A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were
exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this
rule.225

Comment [2] applied only to instances when the lawyer was acting “in the
course of representing a client.”226 It further required the lawyer
“knowingly” to manifest bias or prejudice by “words or conduct.”227 The
Comment also required a showing that “such actions are prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”228 Finally, a lawyer was not subject to discipline
solely upon a finding by a court that the lawyer had exercised peremptory
challenges on a discriminatory basis.229
Neither the Ethics 2000 Commission nor the Ethics 20/20 Commission
offered any recommendations to add a Rule 8.4(g). For fifteen years,
Comment [2] served as the ABA’s statement regarding the discipline of
lawyers for discriminatory or harassing behavior. In 2014, a renewed effort
to add an anti-discrimination rule began.

221. Proceedings of the 1998 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 25
(1998).
222. Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Presented Jointly with the
Criminal Justice Section, 123:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 611, 611 (1998) [hereinafter Standing Committee].
223. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 46 (1998).
224. See Standing Committee, supra note 222, at 611 (exempting discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges from the Rule’s coverage).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 223, at 46 (adopting
and reprinting the Comment).
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B. Core Values and Drafting Model Rule 8.4(g)
1.

Rule 8.4(g)

In 2016, with “no debate in the House and few overt signs of opposition,”
the House of Delegates added Rule 8.4(g) to the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.230 If by this statement the authors intended to
convey the impression of a near-universal agreement among lawyers that
Rule 8.4(g), as written, was now unobjectionable, that would be
misleading.231 As adopted, Model Rule 8.4(g) declares:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. . . engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph
does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.232

Rule 8.4(g) extended the scope of earlier efforts to prohibit harassment and
discrimination by lawyers in several ways. First, it sanctioned the use of the
attorney disciplinary system as an additional tool to mitigate or eliminate
harassment and discrimination. Second, the standard of culpability was
whether the lawyer “reasonably should know”; actual knowledge, as
required in Comment [2], was no longer the standard.233 Third, it added
230. Laird & Podgers, supra note 34 at 59; see also Dennis Rendleman, The Crusade Against Model
Rule 8.4(g), ABA (Oct. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/
2018/october-2018/the-crusade-against-model-rule-8-4-g-/ [https://perma.cc/2YGA-D2CK] (“All
the issues being raised against Rule 8.4(g) were raised during the three-year development process, and
were considered by the drafters, and are accommodated in the balance that Rule 8.4(g) presents. It is
worth noting that the amendment passed the 598-member . . . ABA House of Delegates by a
unanimous voice vote.”). What has happened at the ABA Midyear and Annual Meetings since 2014
must be pieced together from ABA Journal reports and online content made available by the ABA, for
the most recently published ABA annual report was for the meetings held in February and August
2013.
231. David L. Hudson Jr., Constitutional Conflict: States Split on Model Rule Limiting Harassing
Conduct, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2017, at 25, 25–26 (highlighting disagreement regarding the constitutionality of
Rule 8.4(g)).
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
233. Compare id. (including the language “reasonably should know”), with Proceedings for the Annual
Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 223, at 46 (including the standard of actual knowledge).
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three attributes—ethnicity, gender identity, and marital status—to the eight
categories previously listed.234 This mostly followed the approach taken by
the ABA in 2007 in amending the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The
Judicial “Code’s list of improper bases for discrimination” was enlarged to
include “the categories of ethnicity, marital status, gender, and political
affiliation.”235 The absence of the last category in Rule 8.4(g) indicates the
ABA’s intention that discrimination or harassment by a lawyer on the basis
of political affiliation concerning the practice of law is not professional
misconduct subject to discipline. Fourth, paragraph (g) encompassed
“conduct related to the practice of law,” not merely conduct representing a
client.236 Fifth, it added a client advice exception, but limited that exception
to “legitimate advice,” a perplexing concept.237
The House also adopted three Comments that explained the Rule’s scope.
New Comment [3] declared “discrimination includes harmful verbal or
physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”238 Thus,
a lawyer who spoke or wrote in a way that manifested “bias or prejudice
towards others” engaged in misconduct, if that verbal conduct (sometimes
known as a “speech act”)239 was harmful. The Comment did not explain
what it meant by “harmful.” Rule 2.3(C) of the 2007 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, from which (through its 1990 predecessor) this language was
taken, did not include a requirement of showing “harm.”240 Because
Comment [3] did not give any examples of what was meant by
“verbal . . . conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others,” and
because Comment [2] to Rule 2.3 did,241 readers could apply a familiar
transitive property of interpretation. Examples of manifesting bias or
prejudice included “epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative
stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening,
intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race,
ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
235. ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, AM. BAR
ASS’N, REPORT 4 (2006), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/code-of-judicial-conduct/aba-joint-commreport-nov-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXX-W3VL].
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Id. at cmt. 3.
239. Classic examples of verbal conduct include saying “I do” at one’s wedding or soliciting the
listener to kill a third party.
240. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
241. See id. at Canon 2.3 cmt. 2 (providing such examples).
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characteristics.”242 Further, Comment [3] stated harassment included
“sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical
conduct.”243 If a lawyer engaged in “derogatory or demeaning verbal . . .
conduct,” no showing of harm was required.244 Comment [3] gave
examples of sexual harassment, but did not explain what constituted
“derogatory or demeaning” verbal conduct.245
Comment [4] defined “[c]onduct related to the practice of law” as
extending to “participating in bar association, business or social activities in
connection with the practice of law.”246 In fostering ABA Goal III, this
Comment also declared not violative of the rule any “conduct undertaken
to promote diversity and inclusion,” such as “recruiting, hiring, retaining
and advancing diverse employees.”247 Implicit within this statement is the
use by lawyers of the spoken or written word “to promote diversity and
inclusion.”
Finally, Comment [5] retained the exemption that a judicial finding that a
lawyer made peremptory challenges on a discriminatory basis was, alone,
insufficient to violate Rule 8.4(g).248 It added another exemption by stating
a lawyer does not violate the rule by “limiting the scope or subject matter of
the lawyer’s practice or by limiting the lawyer’s practice to members of
underserved populations.”249 The breadth of “scope or subject matter” is
unclear.
For example, would it permit a lawyer to limit a
matrimonial/divorce practice to men in matters against women?250

242. Id.
243. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
244. Id.
245. Id. The previous Comment [3] (originally Comment [2]) was deleted because its provisions
were substantially moved to the rule itself.
246. Id. at cmt. 4.
247. Id.
248. Id. at cmt. 5.
249. Id.
250. Cf. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (M.C.A.D. 1997), aff’d, Nathanson v. Mass.
Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Sept. 16, 2003)
(upholding a ruling by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination of gender discrimination
by a lawyer for refusing to take the case of a potential male client because she limited her practice to
women). See generally Michele N. Struffolino, For Men Only: A Gap in the Rules Allows Sex Discrimination
to Avoid Ethical Challenge, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 487 (2015) (highlighting a pre-8.4(g)
discussion of the ethics of limiting practice to men only); Bradley S. Abramson, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):
Constitutional and Other Concerns for Matrimonial Lawyers, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 283 (2019)
(presenting a post-8.4(g) discussion).
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Debating and Adopting Rule 8.4(g)

“Diversity, inclusion, and equity, both in the legal profession and in the
pursuit of justice, are core values of the American Bar Association . . . .”251
To aid in reaching Goal III, the ABA created several commissions with
particular responsibilities.252 In May 2014, leaders of four of those
commissions wrote encouraging the Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility to “draft amendments to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that would directly address lawyer bias, prejudice, and
harassment in the black letter of the Rules.”253 In the view of the Goal III
commissions, Comment [3] (formerly 1998 Comment [2], unchanged other
than in number) to Rule 8.4 was “not sufficient for this purpose.”254
The Committee drafted an initial proposal to amend Rule 8.4 in summer
2015; a second was produced at the end of the year.255 The second version
was released for public comment and was the subject of a two-hour hearing
at the ABA’s February 2016 meeting.256 Unlike the favorable testimony for
the rule at this hearing, written comments on the proposed rule were
mixed.257 One divisive subject was the breadth of the rule’s application.
251. AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III REPORT 2020: THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE ABA’S
LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERS 3 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/diversity-inclusion-center/2020_goal_iii_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3K5-9YKW].
252. See id. (listing the commissions). The Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession, Commission on Women in the Profession, Commission on Disability Rights, Commission
on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and Commission on Hispanic Legal Rights and
Responsibilities, as well as several other entities, are housed in the ABA’s Diversity and Inclusion
Center. Id.; see also Diversity and Inclusion Center, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/
[https://perma.cc/Y5JH-RV57] (providing information about the various commissions).
253. STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP., AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISIONS TO MODEL
RULE 8.4, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter Language Choice Narrative], https://lalegalethics.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015-07-16-ABA-Proposed-Amendment-to-Rule-8.4-re-Harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S4HJ-6NCQ] (providing a working discussion draft).
254. See id. (indicating the text of the letter is found in Appendix A, which is not attached to the
document online).
255. See id. at 2–3 (presenting the initial draft proposal); Memorandum from Am. Bar Ass’n
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. 2–3 (Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter ABA Memorandum on
Rule 8.4 Amendment], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional
_responsibility/rule_8_4_language_choice_memo_12_22_2015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M7MG-5XGT] (proposing a revised draft). The successive versions of paragraph (g) and
accompanying Comments are detailed in Halaby & Long, supra note 33 at 212–15, 223–31.
256. Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 216. See generally Transcript of Hearing on Proposed
Amendment to Model Rule 8.4, Am. Bar Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/
february_2016_public_hearing_transcript.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2UB-43SW].
257. Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 218–23.
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The Goal III Commissions urged the rule be as broadly applicable as
possible. That included eliminating the actual knowledge requirement.258
Other ABA groups were less enthusiastic, and the nearly 500 written
comments, most by individuals, were “[o]verwhelmingly . . . negative.”259
A third version, which omitted any scienter element, was published in
spring 2016. This draft also broadly interpreted “conduct related to the
practice of law.”260 It was also the first version to include in the comments
the exception that conduct (again, implicitly speech as well as actions)
intended to promote diversity did not violate the rule.261 Shortly before the
August 2016 meeting, a fourth version was substituted for the third. It
added the “reasonably should know” (and actual knowledge) standard and
brought back several other exceptions, such as the statement in the
comment that a judicial finding that a lawyer made peremptory challenges
on a constitutionally discriminatory basis was alone not sufficient to violate
the rule.262 Less than ten days later, a fifth and final version was offered to
meet the demands of those ABA entities wavering or opposed to the
proposal. This version added the final sentence, “This paragraph does not
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”263
Added at this late hour, what the ABA meant by “legitimate” advice or
advocacy was unstated. Further, by including in paragraph (g) that speech
in the form of legitimate “advice” did not violate the rule, was the
implication of this statement that other types of “speech” could violate the
rule? On agreement to this last pre-debate amendment, dissension
dissipated, and paragraph (g) passed with no debate and little public
opposition in the House of Delegates.
Half of the states had no anti-discrimination rule as of 2016.264
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 218.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225, 227.
Id. at 228–30.
Id. at 230–31. See STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP. ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 1 (2016), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/final_revised_resolution_and_
report_109.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSM5-FGQX] (printing a redlined final version of proposed
paragraph (g)).
264. Cf. Language Choice Narrative, supra note 253, at 1 (noting, in 2015, twenty-four jurisdictions
had adopted anti-bias or anti-harassment provisions in their lawyer disciplinary rules); Rendleman, supra
note 230 (noting, in 2018, “more than 25 jurisdictions” had provisions “making it an ethical violation
for a lawyer to discriminate or harass another”). An updated comparison to November 2020 is
available at CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA
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C. Core Values and Interpreting Rule 8.4(g), 2016–2020
1.

Formal Opinion 493 (2020)

Since the adoption by the ABA of Model Rule 8.4(g), four states—
Vermont (2017),265 Maine (2019),266 New Mexico (2020),267 and
Pennsylvania (2020)268—have adopted some variant of Model
Rule 8.4(g).269 No state appellate court has written an opinion interpreting
its version of Rule 8.4(g) in a disciplinary matter since mid-2016.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 8.4: MISCONDUCT (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_
8_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UR6-DKGD] (providing comparisons by state as of November 9, 2020).
265. VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021).
266. ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021) (stating it is unprofessional conduct for
a lawyer to “engage in conduct or communication related to the practice of law that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity. (1) ‘Discrimination’ on the basis
of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity as
used in this section means conduct or communication that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know
manifests an intention: to treat a person as inferior based on one or more of the characteristics listed
in this paragraph; to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of
one or more of the listed characteristics; or to cause or attempt to cause interference with the fair
administration of justice based on one or more of the listed characteristics. (2) ‘Harassment’ on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity
as used in this section means derogatory or demeaning conduct or communication and includes, but is
not limited to, unwelcome sexual advances, or other conduct or communication unwelcome due to its
implicit or explicit sexual content. (3) ‘Related to the practice of law’ as used in the section means
occurring in the course of representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel,
lawyers, and others while engaged in the practice of law; or operating or managing a law firm or law
practice. (4) Declining representation, limiting one’s practice to particular clients or types of clients,
and advocacy of policy positions or changes in the law are not regulated by Rule 8.4(g).”).
267. New Mexico adopted Rule 8.4(g) effective December 1, 2020. See N.M. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 16-804(g) (2021) (noting it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital
status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to
accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 16-116 NMRA
[New Mexico Rules Annotated]. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy
consistent with these rules.”).
268. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021).
269. See CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264 (listing adoptions); Kristine A.
Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in
the Practice of Law, ABA (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_
industry/publications/under_construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/XUB6Z474] (noting, as of March 2019, Vermont had replaced an earlier version of 8.4(g) with the revised
ABA Rule, which was also adopted by the Northern Mariana Islands, the US Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa).
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On July 15, 2020, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 493, offering “guidance on the
purpose, scope, and application” of paragraph (g).270 The opinion began
with examples of behavior that “disgrace the entire legal profession.”271 It
then noted the breadth of paragraph (g): “[A] single instance of a lawyer
making a derogatory sexual comment directed toward another individual in
connection with the practice of law would likely not be severe or pervasive
enough to violate Title VII, but would violate Rule 8.4(g).”272 The
Committee’s example indicates speech (a “single . . . derogatory sexual
comment”) that does not violate Title VII, and therefore is unlikely to be
characterized as verbal conduct, violates paragraph (g).
Though the Opinion does not use the phrase “core values,” it explains
the justification of paragraph (g) in those terms. For example, it notes:
“Preventing sexual harassment is a particular objective of” the rule.273 This
meets an important aspect of Goal III. It seems unexceptional to believe
that lawyers who were victims of sexual harassment might reasonably
consider leaving and have left the legal profession. Even if such victims
eventually decided to remain in the practice of law, such an experience could
negatively affect them, and thus, impinge the core value of diversity.
Similarly, the Opinion, quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court, discusses the
impact of “racially-biased actions” by lawyers: Such actions “not only
undermine confidence in our system of justice, but also erode the very
foundation upon which justice is based.”274 In addition to the impact on
the lawyers and others who are subjected to racially discriminatory actions
by lawyers, such actions impair core values of the legal profession: the duties
to improve the system of justice, to promote justice, and to contribute to
the legal system’s capacity to do justice.
The Formal Opinion concludes with five hypothetical instances to which
paragraph (g) might apply. Unfortunately, the hypotheticals are simple,
possibly simplistic. (In its defense, it appears the Committee was in part

270. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 1 (2020) [hereinafter Formal
Op. 493].
271. Id. at 2 (quoting Mullaney v. Aude, 730 A.2d 759, 767 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)). The
opinion cites cases involving “derogatory, sexual comments,” id., and “race-based misconduct,” id. at 2
n.6.
272. Id. at 4.
273. Id. at 7.
274. Id. at 11 (quoting In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct, 597 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn.
1999).
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responding to arguments attacking the rule.) The first three outline some
of the limits of paragraph (g). The initial hypothetical affirms a lawyer may
represent a religious organization challenging, on constitutional grounds, an
ordinance requiring gender-neutral bathrooms.275 This is answered in
paragraph (g)’s text. Why the Committee offered a hypothetical so prosaic
is unclear. The Opinion then oddly includes this sentence in its “answer”:
“Though individuals may disagree with the position the lawyer in the
hypothetical would be defending, that would not affect the legitimacy of the
representation.”276 The American lawyer is steeped in the core values that
even the most unpopular person (the “worst of the worst”) deserves
representation (recall the ABA’s swift response to attacks on lawyers
representing Guantanamo detainees in 2007) and that the adversary system
testing “disagreements” is central to the American system of justice. In a
formal opinion to lawyers about the “legitimacy” of representing clients
making non-frivolous constitutional claims, to include this sentence is
baffling. The second hypothetical is based on an actual argument made by
law professor Richard Sander regarding affirmative action.277 In general,
the argument suggests affirmative action may have deleterious
consequences for some African-American students, including law students.
The hypothetical considers whether making such an argument in a speech
to lawyers is subject to discipline.278 The answer is no. Again, one aspect
of its explanation strikes an odd note. The Opinion states, “the lawyer’s
remarks, without more, would not constitute” a violation of
paragraph (g).279 What constitutes “more” is unstated.280 It is a deeply
unsatisfying answer, for it seems to assume that some aspect of one’s
opinion might not pass muster. The third hypothetical to which
paragraph (g) does not apply is a lawyer’s membership in a legal organization
that “advocates, on religious grounds, for the ability of private employers to
terminate or refuse to employ individuals based on their sexual orientation
or gender identity.”281 The answer ends by declaring a lawyer may “express

275. Id. at 12.
276. Id.
277. RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012).
278. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 12.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 13.
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the view” that a decision of the Supreme Court is wrong.282 This is cold
comfort. As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in 1953 of the Supreme Court,
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final.”283 If this were not the case, then doublespeak would be the
language of the day.
The final two hypotheticals offer two examples when a lawyer, in the
In the first
Committee’s opinion, has violated paragraph (g).284
(hypothetical 4), a lawyer and adjunct professor has “made repeated
comments about the student’s appearance and also made unwelcome,
nonconsensual physical contact of a sexual nature with the student.”285
This case presents no interpretive difficulties. Why would the Committee
expend any effort on such a simple case?
The last hypothetical offers more food for thought, but it is
disappointingly incomplete and possibly misleading. A lawyer-partner is at
the office planning a new associate orientation program with “a senior
associate.” Apparently to this associate, and only this associate, the partner
says, “Rule #1 should be never trust a Muslim lawyer. Rule #2 should be
never represent a Muslim client. But, of course, we are not allowed to speak
the truth around here.”286 This statement is “related to the practice of law,”
triggering paragraph (g).287 The Opinion concludes the partner has
violated paragraph (g) even if the senior associate is not Muslim and the
remarks are not directed to anyone in particular.288 The Opinion does not
state that the associate has family members or intimate friends who are
Muslim and are known as Muslim by the partner. This limits the ability of
a factfinder to conclude the partner’s speech is verbal conduct, something
more than simply speech. The Opinion offers no explanation why the
speech of this partner to this (non-Muslim) senior associate is verbal
conduct. Next, for the partner’s remarks to manifest bias or prejudice, the
Opinion must assume the partner is not Muslim and is speaking in a deadly
earnest and serious tone.289 Beyond that, the partner is a cipher. What

282. Id.
283. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
284. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13–14.
285. Id. at 13.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 14.
288. Id. at 13–14.
289. One assumes a sarcastic comment does not manifest bias or prejudice but is its opposite.
If the partner is Muslim, then one might assume the partner is joking or otherwise insincere in making
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could possibly possess a partner to consider as “Rule #1” never to trust a
Muslim lawyer? The Pew Research Center estimated “about 3.45 million
Muslims of all ages” in the United States as of 2017.290 The estimated
number of American lawyers as of 2020 is 1,328,692.291 The estimated
population of the United States in 2019 was 328,239,523,292 making lawyers
approximately 0.4% of the population. If those numbers held (which is a
guess), then there are fewer than 14,000 Muslim lawyers in the entire United
States and its territories. The senior associate is also an abstraction, so we
have no context to understand why the partner would confide in the
associate beliefs that the firm has apparently rejected (“But, of course, we
are not allowed to speak the truth around here”).293
The Opinion makes additional assumptions: It declares “[t]he partner’s
remarks are discriminatory in so far as they are harmful and manifest bias
and prejudice against Muslims.”294 The Opinion provides no explanation
of how one determines whether harm has occurred. And harmful to what?
Or to whom? That is, must a person be harmed, or can one claim such
remarks corrode the institutions of the law and thus generate harm? Must
that harm be shown through some evidence? If so, what evidence counts?
If a new associate in the firm learned of the partner’s remarks through
hearsay (rather than the partner repeating the remarks to the new associate)
and believed the remarks have or will negatively affect the associate’s
opportunity to succeed in the firm, is that belief sufficient to decide harm
has occurred? It may be the Opinion is suggesting this unenlightened
comment is necessarily harmful, but that is a mere inference. The closest
the Opinion comes to that view is its speculation that the partner’s “remarks
may influence how similarly-situated firm lawyers treat clients, opposing
counsel, and others at the firm who are Muslim.”295 First, that would
these remarks. The speaker’s tone is often critical to understanding the remarks, and tone often plays
poorly when translated to the written word.
290. Besheer Mohamed, New Estimates Show U.S. Muslim Population Continues to Grow, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-smuslim-population-continues-to-grow/ [https://perma.cc/KTH6-PKFR].
291. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 2020, at 106 (2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/potlp2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDQ5-YX3V]. This includes all lawyers, not just the subset of those practicing law.
292. 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation’s Growth is Slowing, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/popest-nation.
html [https://perma.cc/27PW-DBG6].
293. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 14.
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require the remarks to travel to others in the firm, and require the partner’s
influence to be so great that other lawyers decide simply to follow along in
making the factually-free claims that Muslim lawyers are untrustworthy and
Muslims should never be clients. Again, that assumption ignores the part
of the statement made by the partner, “But, of course, we are not allowed
to speak the truth around here.” Taken at face value, “we are not allowed”
indicates the partner’s views are rejected by the firm or some significant
group in the firm. Why would any other lawyer in the firm take on a
minority (I assume) position when that opinion is generally disapproved by
those who wield power? Second, “may influence” suggests no proof of illtreatment of Muslims is required. It’s enough that it might happen. Third,
the Opinion assumes a senior associate so under the partner’s thumb that
the associate’s moral agency is lost. Again, the partner’s view is (apparently)
a minority view, as declared in the hypothetical itself. That strengthens the
associate’s moral position, including disagreeing with the partner. This
argument requires much more to be persuasive. Finally, the associate may
simply ignore the comment as a futile rant of a bigoted lawyer and learn to
intentionally think about how not to speak in stereotypical, discriminatory
fashion.
Is factually related criticism that includes a mention of a listed category
sufficient to manifest bias? For example, a lawyer is well known in the
community for his assertions regarding the importance of his religious faith
in his life and how it informs the manner in which he practices law. He is
charged with fraud upon the court, or suborning perjury, or bribing a juror.
Opposing counsel says in a comment published in the newspaper, “That
lawyer isn’t a real Christian, but a servant of his own greed; his dirty tricks
were finally uncovered by the court, and I’m going to be the first to throw
him to the wolves on the disciplinary committee.”
The Opinion also assumes “the partner surely knew or reasonably should
have known this.”296 That is not necessarily true. For example, it is no
secret that the nations of Pakistan and India are not frenemies, much less
allies. It is also no secret that Muslims in India are often the victims of
religious discrimination.297 If the hypothetical partner was a Hindu and
emigrant from India who represented Hindu clients, the comments might
296. Id. at 13.
297. For two fictional examples, see VIKRAM CHANDRA, SACRED GAMES (2006) (presenting a
recurring motif of religious tension and discrimination in India, and offering a gripping interlude of the
movement of Muslims from India to newly formed Pakistan) and the Oscar-winning movie SLUMDOG
MILLIONAIRE (Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. 2008) (telling the Oscar-winning story of a young Indian man).
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“manifest bias and prejudice against Muslims,”298 but also might manifest
a desire to protect the partner’s livelihood by hewing ever more tightly to
this particular legal practice. Should the lawyer know that these remarks
were harmful manifestations of bias or prejudice against Muslims? Is the
lawyer’s background (born in India, Hindu, represents Hindu clients)
evidence for or against possession of knowledge that the remarks manifest
bias or prejudice? Would evidence of both motives be sufficient to
determine the partner had violated Rule 8.4(g)?
More generally, the manner in which one speaks (or doesn’t) to persons
who are not intimate family and friends is often guided by a particular and
largely tacit cultural understanding. One of the justifications the Committee
gave for adopting Rule 8.4(g) was the “need for a cultural shift in
understanding the inherent integrity of people regardless of their race [and
the other ten listed categories].”299 In a nation that is as diverse as the
United States, with lawyers a part of or with ties to those many diverse
communities, it is difficult to understand the language of “a cultural shift.”
The effect of particular cultural understandings on whether and how one
speaks, as well as how one responds to (perceived) discriminatory
comments, are not uniform in the United States. The Opinion ignores the
many cultures of the United States and its lawyers in pursuit of what it finds
to be “a” cultural problem.300
2.

Greenberg v. Haggerty (2020)

In 1995, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility chose
to offer an aspirational “policy statement” condemning discriminatory
speech and conduct rather than an ethics rule because, as its chair told the
House, “no satisfactory rule could be drawn” that “would not unduly
impinge on the First Amendment.”301 In December 2020, five months
after the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued
Formal Opinion 493, a federal district court held unconstitutional, on free
speech grounds, Pennsylvania’s Rule 8.4(g) in a pre-enforcement lawsuit.302
298. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13.
299. ABA Memorandum on Rule 8.4 Amendment, supra note 255, at 1–2 (quoting and
adopting, as “eloquently” stated, a statement of the Oregon New Lawyers Division to the YLD).
300. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) (discussing human societies, culture, and cultural symbolism).
301. Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, supra note 202, at 61.
302. See Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 32 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding Pennsylvania’s
Rule 8.4(g) unconstitutional on First Amendment viewpoint discrimination grounds).
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Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) is an amalgamation of
Model Rule 8.4(g) and the 1998 Comment [2] to Rule 8.4. It declares:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(g) in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly manifest bias or
prejudice, or engage in harassment or discrimination, as those terms are
defined in applicable federal, state or local statutes or ordinances, including
but not limited to bias, prejudice, harassment or discrimination based upon
race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status. This
paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw
from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not
preclude advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.303

Zachary Greenberg, a Pennsylvania lawyer who “speaks and writes” “on a
variety of controversial issues,”304 sued the chair of the Pennsylvania
attorney disciplinary board alleging paragraph (g) was a content-based and
viewpoint-based infringement of his free speech rights, as incorporated in
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.305 Greenberg had
not been charged with violating paragraph (g) by the disciplinary board.306
The court held the rule unconstitutional.307
Pennsylvania’s paragraph (g) bans “words or conduct [that] knowingly
manifest bias or prejudice.”308 Neither the ABA’s nor Pennsylvania’s
Comments to Rule 8.4 offer any examples of what kinds of words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice. However, this language tracks
1998 Comment [2] to Model Rule 8.4.309 Comment [2] in turn substantially
followed Canon 3B(6) of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.310
Canon 3B(6) became Rule 2.3(C) of the 2007 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, unchanged in relevant part.311 Model Rule 2.3(C) and the
303. Id. at 16-17 (quoting PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2020)).
304. Id. at 16.
305. Id. at 17.
306. See id. at 21 (stating there was “no history of past enforcement” of the Amendment).
307. Id. at 32.
308. Id. at 16.
309. See Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 217, at 81
(including the text of Comment [2]).
310. As discussed above, Comment [2] added the “knowingly” requirement. See supra
notes 217–19, 227 and accompanying text.
311. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (adding the
phrase “or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to” after
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accompanying Comments were adopted by Pennsylvania in its Code of
Judicial Conduct.312 Those Comments gave examples of words or conduct
that manifest bias or prejudice.
The court thus turned to Comment [2], which declared examples of
manifesting bias or prejudice “include but are not limited to epithets; slurs;
demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon
stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of
connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant
references to personal characteristics.”313 This Comment has great value
in its context. The goal of Rule 2.3 of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial
Conduct is to provide a sense to all who are present that not only is justice
being done in the courts, but that it is perceived as being done. Any judge
who uses racial, ethnic, or other slurs “in the performance of judicial duties,”
or who allows a lawyer to do so “in proceedings before the court,” fails to
act as an unbiased and neutral arbiter, both of which are necessary to do
justice.314 Even if justice is substantively done (however accounted for), a
judge who makes demeaning statements and acts in a biased or prejudicial
fashion toward anyone while performing the duties of a government official
will not be seen to have done justice. Such words or conduct would violate
core values of the profession by failing to promote justice, enhance the
capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice, and improve the system
of justice.
Such offensive and deplorable language made by a person outside of a
court proceeding or performing one’s judicial duties is not, however, left
unprotected by the First Amendment.315 The court decided that included
lawyers. The disciplinary board argued Pennsylvania was permitted to
restrict the speech of lawyers on professional speech grounds. The court
“prejudice,” and adding gender, ethnicity, marital status, and political affiliation to the list of attributes
regarding which speech and conduct was banned).
312. The only change made by Pennsylvania was to use the phrase “gender identity or
expression” instead of the Model Code’s “gender.” Compare PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 2.3(C) (2014) (including Pennsylvania’s change), with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 2.3(C) (using only “gender”).
313. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 32 (E.D. Pa. 2020). See PA. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 2.3 cmt. 2 (2014) (“Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties
and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice.
A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.”).
314. PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(B)–(C) (2014).
315. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65 (2017) (discussing the broad
reach of First Amendment rights and how a “disparagement clause” violates Free Speech rights).
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rejected the argument,316 and held paragraph (g)’s ban on words that
manifest bias or prejudice was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.317
The court did not justify its opinion on core values language. It did note,
however, that:
[The] Rule represents the government restricting speech outside of the
courtroom, outside of the context of a pending case, and even outside the
much broader playing field of “administration of justice.” Even if Plaintiff
makes a good faith attempt to restrict and self-censor, the Rule leaves Plaintiff
with no guidance as to what is in bounds, and what is out, other than to advise
Plaintiff to scour every nook and cranny of each ordinance, rule, and law in
the Nation.318

ABA President Thomas Wells made “independence of the bar and
judiciary” one of the four “common core values all lawyers share” in his
inaugural message to ABA members.319 The court implicitly found
paragraph (g) a threat to that independence. A lawyer lacking guidance
regarding “what is in bounds, and what is out” will engage in selfcensorship.320 Modifying one’s speech will reduce the lawyer’s, and thus
the bar’s, independence from the government. The court was also aware of
the rule’s “beneficent intentions.”321 Those good intentions were to
enhance diversity, another of Wells’s four goals.322 As between those core
values, the court decided that though Pennsylvania “embarks upon a
friendly, favorable tide, this tide sweeps us all along with the admonished,
minority viewpoint into the massive currents of suppression . . . .”323

316. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 26–30. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra,
585 U.S. _____, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–73 (2018) (holding “[the] Court’s precedents do not recognize
such a tradition for a category called ‘professional speech[,]’” and noting only two exceptions: 1) when
the speech is commercial speech, and 2) when “regulations of professional conduct . . . incidentally
burden speech”). The Greenberg court concluded, “Rule 8.4(g) does not regulate the specific types of
attorney speech or professional speech that the Supreme Court has identified as warranting a
deferential review. The speech that Rule 8.4(g) regulates is entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment.” Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 30.
317. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 32–33.
318. Id. at 32.
319. Wells, supra note 30, at 9.
320. See Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 31–32 (describing censorship and how Pennsylvania
Rule 8.4(g) may lead lawyers to self-censor).
321. Id. at 32.
322. Wells, supra note 30, at 9.
323. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 32.
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Other Reactions, 2016–2020

In the aftermath of the ABA’s adoption of paragraph (g), state attorneys
general in Texas, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Tennessee issued opinions
concluding Model Rule 8.4(g) was unconstitutional.324 None of those
states had adopted any version of ABA paragraph (g).325 The state supreme
courts in Idaho,326 Tennessee,327 and Arizona328 rejected petitions to add
paragraph (g). Neither Idaho nor Arizona has adopted any version of
paragraph (g). If Greenberg stands, Vermont, Maine, and New Mexico will
be the only three states to respond officially to the ABA’s 2016 action by
the end of 2020.329 The joiners would make a majority, but the dissenters
would comprise a significant minority.
V. CONCLUSION
In these fractured times, it would be unsurprising if state adoption or
rejection of paragraph (g) divided largely along political lines. Such a result,
even if predictable, would be deleterious to the American legal profession.
A division along such lines might make finding common ground over some
shared agreements about what lawyers should do, and why they should do
it, more difficult. Enhancing diversity and eliminating bias is and should
remain a core value of American lawyers. So too should the independence
of the bar from an overweening, though well-intentioned government. It
may be asking too much for lawyers to agree to some resolution that satisfies
those who give primacy to one of these core values at the expense of
another. At least, the profession may assist itself by looking more deeply at
the tension between these core values. The intractable tension lawyers face
in attempting to meet the duties they owe is a story as old as the law itself.
324. See Josh Blackman, ABA Model Rule 8.4(G) in the States, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 629, 630–33
(2019) (summarizing opinions).
325. See generally CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264 (listing various states’
adoptions and rejections). This document does not have page numbers but is nonetheless subdivided
by pages in a PDF format. The reader may scroll down until the pertinent state is found alphabetically,
scroll down counting the pages, or search using the Find function (CTRL-F on a PC or CMD-F on a
Macintosh).
326. Id. at 8.
327. Id. at 23.
328. Id. at 2. The Montana legislature issued a joint resolution opposing adoption of
Rule 8.4(g). S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017). Jurisdiction on this lies with the Montana
Supreme Court.
329. CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264. See supra notes 265–69 and
accompanying text.
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The duties to represent clients zealously, to serve as an officer of the court,
and to serve the greater community as a public citizen may often clash, with
little likelihood of resolution.
A summer 2018 story on Law360 discussed the ABA’s rapidly shrinking
membership.330 The report largely focused on the economic consequences
of the membership decline to the organization. The effect of this decline,
of course, has a much broader impact. For the ABA, a membership less
than half its previous size makes it less likely the ABA will possess the
influence to persuade other bar associations and the nation’s 1.3 million
lawyers they should embrace specific core values. The ABA can promulgate
rules or policies as it wishes, but if it is perceived as representing merely a
segment of the bar, its persuasive authority will quickly diminish. That
would serve as another sign that the fractured profession will be ever
present.
The core values problem is likely to intensify in the next decade or so.
This is, in significant part, a problem of both definition and order, and is
particularly related to the idea of core values that protect society’s interests.
Can the contending parties reach some agreement on the core values that
are the reason lawyers (still) maintain their privileged place in the American
democratic experiment? And will lawyers use their rhetorical and persuasive
gifts to impress upon each other, as well as the general public, why they
should continue to take the problem seriously, as well as humbly?

330. See generally Aebra Coe, ABA Decline: Why Are Fewer Lawyers Joining the Club?, LAW360
(July 24, 2018, 10:42 AM), https://www.legalmosaic.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ABAStory.pdf [https://perma.cc/AND3-MPAE] (discussing possible reasons behind the ABA’s
diminishing member base).

